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Abstract
A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter
and YouTube). In a simple model we assume that while social media allow to observe all previous
decisions, mass media only give aggregate information about the state of a revolt. We show, rst, that
when individualswillingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts of media foster a successful
revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private information, only social media ensure that
a revolt succeeds, with mass media multiple outcomes are possible. This suggests that social media
enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more than traditional mass media.
Keywords : social media, mass media, revolution, coordination game, sequential games
JEL Classication : C72, D02, D74
1 Introduction
"We use Facebook to schedule protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world." (Anony-
mous Cairo Activist)
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In the rst months of 2011 a cascade of revolutions swept through the Arab world. A distinguishing
feature of the uprisings was the omnipresence of social media (especially, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube).1
Social media a¤ect the evolution of protests in various ways. They o¤er an easy, quick and inexpensive
means of communication that helps to spread information and facilitates community creation (e.g. Garrett
(2006)). Through dense interconnections and a decentralized structure, communication between protesters
becomes robust and less susceptible to possible (and likely targeted) disruption (see Friedland and Rogerson
(2009)). In spite of heavily controlled traditional mass media, social media technology helps to inform audi-
ences around the world about the unfolding of the events, attracting international attention and provoking
diplomatic pressure.2
Though there is a diverse set of theories about political protests and social movements, most of these
theories identify e¢ cient mobilization as a key factor to achieve the goals of any movement.3 Mobilization
relies on the channels of communication and the ow of information that enable protesters (both the actual
and potential ones) to organize themselves and engage in collective action. Hence, communication and the
technologies that make it possible play a crucial role in mobilization.
In this paper, we present a model that explains how mass and social media a¤ect mobilization when
it is known that there are enough willing individuals to overthrow the dictator. Our starting point is
that willingness to participate in the protests depends on the perceived costs and benets of participation,
as proposed by the resource mobilization literature in sociology (e.g. Klandermans (1984), Opp (2009)).
Arguably, heading out onto the streets implies the costs of facing tear gas, rubber bullets and potential
arrest and incarceration. Benets involve the perceived gains in participating in an uprising that may bring
about a better future, provided it succeeds. The probability of success is highly related to the number of
participants. Yet, when a potential protester decides whether to participate, possibly she has only a vague
idea about if su¢ cient other people will participate. Di¤erent types of media may a¤ect these expectations
(and the resulting mobilization) in diverse ways. We study how individualsdecisions to participate in the
revolution is a¤ected by two di¤erent communication technologies: mass and social media.
We posit that when an individual obtains information through mass media then she gets to know the
actual state of the revolution in that moment, whereas when informed via social media she is able to observe
1Protesters in Tunesia, Egypt and other Arab countries were not the rst to use Internet actively to organize themselves
and inform the world. For instance, during the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004 or the Iranian protest in 2009 (dubbed as
the Twitter revolution) social media had a prominent role (e.g. Goldstein (2007) and Kamalipour (2010)).
2However, it should also be noted that Internet is a value-neutral technology that is also used by the repressive regimes for
surveillance purposes, for blocking and hacking websites and e-mails (see, for instance, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (2010)).
3Opp (2009) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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the sequence of decisions leading up to that state. For instance, when a search in Twitter is realized, the
individual gets the last conversations about the topic, and by scrolling down the page she is able to see all
previous tweets about it. In Facebook, the users may comment on the events and all previous comments
can be read. We suppose that tweets and comments are informative about the individualsdecision to join
the protests or to stay at home. By contrast, when TV or radio inform about the state of a given event, the
precise history remains hidden, only aggregate information about the turnout is reported.
We model the problem of revolution as a coordination problem. We suppose that there are two groups
in the society: one consists of individuals who want to overthrow the dictator (willing individuals) and the
another one is composed of individuals who do not want to change the regime (unwilling individuals). We
assume that there are enough willing individuals to bring about a change. That is, if all of them revolt,
then the dictator is overthrown. However, if the number of protesters (those willing individuals who actually
head onto the streets) falls short of a critical mass, then the dictator remains in power and may punish those
who participated in the failed revolt. We assume that individuals choose consecutively if they want to take
part in the revolt or not, and the order of decisions is randomly selected. Before decision, each individual
is informed about the state of the revolution. When this information is channeled through mass media, the
individual learns how many people have already chosen to participate (i.e. the actual state of the revolution).
The di¤erence when informed through the social media is that individuals observe each of the past decisions
(e.g. the precise history).
First, we show that when the type of individuals (that is, if she is willing to revolt or not) is public
information and they are informed through any of the communication technologies, each willing individual
takes part in the revolution and, thus, it is successful. However, it is not necessarily the case when the
individuals receive no information about the state of the revolution. This result indicates that the mere
existence of communication technologies that enable to spread information facilitates that social movements
achieve their objective. Without the communication technologies individuals play a simultaneous game that
has multiple equilibria, whereas the means of communication transforms the game into a sequential one in
which the equilibrium outcome is unique.
Second, we study a more realistic setup in which the type of individuals is not observed (i.e. it is private
information). We assume that individuals know that there are enough individuals to change the regime, but
they do not know who the willing individuals are. Under these circumstances, the type of communication
technology becomes relevant. We prove that mass media do not necessarily enable willing individuals to
organize themselves e¢ ciently. Thus, depending on the perceived costs and benets willing individuals
possibly choose not to revolt. However, successful revolution is the unique equilibrium outcome when willing
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individuals use social media, independently of the severity of punishment that protesters may su¤er if they
fail to overthrow the dictator. This result shows that communication through social media facilitates that
revolutions succeed more than when communication is channeled through traditional mass media.
Although our comparison of mass and social media suggests that they are competing communication
technologies, our results can be interpreted as answering the question about how social media enhances mass
medias ability to mobilize individuals. In this respect, our ndings shed light on the di¤erential e¤ect that
social media have compared to the traditional mass media.
Section 2 presents the model and the results. In Section 3 we discuss two examples. All the proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We study in a simple model how di¤erent communication technologies determine the outcome of a revolt.
Suppose that there is a nite set of individuals, N = f1; 2; :::; ng and a dictator. Each individual chooses an
action ai 2 fr; sg where r means "revolt" and s "stay at home".4 We assume that each individual decides
only once, and therefore decisions cannot be changed. Each person i is either of type  i = w (willing to revolt)
or  i = x (unwilling). Changing the regime is assumed to be the socially e¢ cient outcome (as it will be clear
from the payo¤s). Willing individuals are ready to participate in protests, unwilling individuals are reluctant
to do so. We suppose that there is a xed amount  of individuals of the willing type, # fi :  i = wg = ;
 2 (0; n) and, therefore the number of unwilling citizens is also xed, # fi :  i = xg = n   .5 We assume
that n and  are common knowledge.
Individuals decide in a sequence. Let the type vector  = (1; 2; ::; n) denote the sequence of individuals.
The set of sequences of length n with  willing citizens is given by
n; = f : # f j 2  :  j = wg = g:
There are
 
n


possible type vectors and any of them is selected with equal probability.
The utility of each individual i depends on her type and the actions chosen by all individuals. The amount
of individuals participating in the revolution that is necessary to bring the revolt to triumph is given by the
threshold t. Thus, the dictator is overthrown, if and only if at least t citizens decide to revolt.6 Otherwise
4We follow the terminology and notation of Chwe (2000) who studies the conditions of the social structure that allow
successful revolts.
5We use "individual" and "citizen" in an interchangeable manner.
6Collective action has been studied in the literature using threshold models since Schelling (1977) and Granovetter (1978).
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the dictator remains in power. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that t   is common knowledge, so
there are always su¢ cient willing individuals in the society to change the regime and it is known by everyone.
However, although the change is achieveable, it needs the coordinated action of individuals whose decision
depends on the expected costs and benets of participating in the revolution.
Let ai be the action chosen by individual i and let a = (a1; a2; ::; an) be the prole of actions. We assume
that the utility of a willing individual is
ui (w; a : ai = r;# faj : aj = r; j 2 Ng  t) = uw;r;R (1)
ui (w; a : ai = r;# faj : aj = r; j 2 Ng < t) = uw;r;F
ui (w; a : ai = s) = uw;s
with uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F
In words, willing individualsutility is highest when they participate in a successful revolution (uw;r;R).7
If they stay at home, they derive less utility (uw;s).8 The lowest utility is derived from taking part in a
revolution that is defeated. The payo¤uw;r;F can be interpreted as the punishment that the dictator imposes
on protesters who participate in a revolution that fails. Su¤ering this punishment is the potential cost of
participation. The utility of the willing individuals generates a game among them that resembles the classic
stag-hunt situation.
With respect to unwilling individuals, we assume that they always prefer to stay at home:
ui (x; a : ai = s) = ux;s
ui (x; a : ai = r) = ux;r
ux;s > ux;r
For simplicity, unwilling individuals are all those individuals who would not participate in the revolt
(whatever reasons they might have). Although their choice is always the same, their presence makes coor-
dination di¢ cult, since a willing individual who observes somebody staying at home does not know if it is
due to an unwilling citizen or a willing one who decided not to participate in the revolt.
7 In the utilities, the rst subscript refers to the type of the individual, the second to the action that she undertakes, whereas
the third one indicates the outcome. R represents a successful revolution, while F denotes that it has failed.
8The utility of staying at home may depend on whether the revolution triumphs or not. A successful revolt may bring better
life to a willing individual who by staying at home avoids the costs of the revolution. Thus, there may be free-riding issues
at stake as well (see for instance Lohmann (1993)). Although these are interesting questions (and promising venues of future
research), we disregard them and focus on the coordination problem embedded in the above payo¤s.
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Notice that given these payo¤s, the rst best is achieved if the willing people coordinate and overthrow
the dictator. The reason is that unwilling individualsutility is not a¤ected by the outcome of the revolt,
whereas willing individuals are better o¤ if the uprising is successful.
We suppose that the index of the individual (i 2 N) corresponds to her position in the sequence of
decisions. The information about past decisions that is available to individuals depends on the communication
technology. We consider three possibilities:
 No technology : Individuals ignore previous choices when deciding.
 Mass media technology: The individuals have aggregate information about the actions that have been
already taken. We model this fact by introducing into the information set of each individual the
number of actions carried out by the predecessors. This represents a situation in which individuals
obtain information through radio or television about the state of the revolution before making their
decision and observe the aggregate turnout in the protests.
 Social media technology : The individuals observe the individual action of each predecessor. This means
that individual i knows exactly which action was chosen by each of its i 1 predecessors. When deciding
whether to participate in the revolution, through Facebook or Twitter (or any other social media) the
individual observes the exact history of previous decisions.
Let 'i denote the information set of individual i. When no communication technology is available, then
'i = f ig. Thus, in this case individuals only know their own types, but nothing about other individuals
decisions. Mass media technology implies 'i = f i; i; i  i   1g where i represents the number of indi-
viduals who have decided to revolt up to individual i (i = # faj = r; j < ig).9 The information set under
the social media technology becomes 'i = f i; faj ;8j < igg, so each previous decision is observed, ordered
according to the position.10
When no communication technology exists, the lack of information generates a simultaneous-move game.
For the other two cases we need to specify the extent to which previous decisions are observable through the
communication technologies. When dening the information sets, we assumed implicitly that if a commu-
nication technology is available to the society, then individuals are completely informed. As a consequence,
9Thus, we assume that under mass media individuals know both the amount of predecessors who decided to participate and
who chose to stay at home. It is plausible if citizens may infer somehow how many individuals have already decided, that is
they may gure out their position in the sequence of decisions.
10Lohmann (1993, 1994a and 1994b) addresses questions of information aggregation and political action. In her models,
individuals observe each previous action, but she does not study how di¤erent communication technologies a¤ect coordination.
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individuals may infer perfectly their position in the sequence of decisions. Mass and social media report
about all previous decisions: mass media aggregate the information whereas social media present it in a
disaggregated form. Our modeling choice allows us to study in a clear way the di¤erence in the e¤ects that
mass and social media have on the evolution of revolts.11
Our aim is to determine how the di¤erent types of communication technology (or the absence of it)
a¤ect the outcome of revolutions. Moving from no technology towards social media the amount of available
information increases. In principle, the e¤ect of more information is ambiguous: more information may be
good for revolution since it allows a better signaling of own actions to the subsequent individuals; but at
the same time, it could also foster coordination failure, e.g. if individuals nd out that too many of their
predecessors have chosen not to participate in the revolution. Note that they may observe many individuals
staying at home because those observed citizens were the unwilling ones.
2.1 Revolutions under di¤erent information structures
Given our environment, revolution is the socially e¢ cient outcome. However, when information about other
individuals is not available, this e¢ cient outcome may fail to materialize as shown by our rst result.
Proposition 1 If no communication technology is available in the society, there exists an equilibrium in
which nobody revolts and an equilibrium in which the revolution succeeds.
This result is a straightforward consequence of the assumptions on the utilities, that imply the existence
of multiple equilibria in the simultaneous case. Since uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F , for the willing individuals it is
optimal to participate if the other willing individuals are participating, while it is optimal to stay at home if
nobody else is participating. If a willing individual believes that the other willing individuals will participate
in the revolution, then she best responds to this belief by participating as well. However, if they hold the
opposite beliefs, then staying at home is the best response.
The previous result does not depend on whether type is a public information or not. However, when a
communication technology is available this distinction becomes relevant as shown next.
2.1.1 Type is public information
It is instructive to see how the existence of information a¤ects the outcome of revolts in a perfect information
setup in which the willingness to revolt (that is, the type of individuals) is transmitted by the communication
11Arguably, it is unlikely that a society is completely informed about the state of the revolution. A more realistic model would
have people receiving partial aggregate information, some particular information about the decisions of the personal contacts,
and no information about decisions of some others in the society.
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technology. This can be the case, for instance, when the people willing to overthrow the dictator belong
to the same social group (e.g. religious association, ethnic groups or social classes), so that the individual
knows the type of the people who have decided previously. We model this situation introducing the type of
the predecessors in the information available to each individual.
In the case of mass media the information set of individual i includes also the amount of willing in-
dividuals up to (but excluding) individual i, denoted as i. Thus, the information set becomes 'i =
f i; i; i  i   1; ig. Given this information set, individual i knows the amount of willing individuals
that precede her and how many decided to stay at home. This is a valuable information since it also
reveals how many willing individuals are left to decide. For instance, if there were many willing individ-
uals who abstained from participating in the protests, then it is more probable that the total number of
protesters will fall short of the threshold, so staying at home may be a best response. Regarding social me-
dia, the assumption about publicly observed types implies that the information set of individual i becomes
'i = f i; faj ;8j < ig ; f j ;8j < igg. Hence, both the type and decision of each preceding individual are
observed.
We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as our solution concept. Individual is strategy is conditioned on
the information set. It is dened as i : 'i ! fr; sg : Let  = fr; sgn be the games strategy space, and let
 2  be a strategy prole, that is,  = (1; :::;n): Let hi be a history of the game up to i, formed by a
type vector and a sequence of decision, hi = f ; a1; :::; ai 1g. Let i(hi j 'i) denote citizen is belief about
the true history given the available information.
Denition 1 Strategy  2  and belief system  = f1; :::ng are a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
if, and only if, for all i 2 N; given 'i and any ~i 2 fr; sg;
P
hi2n;fr;sgi 1
i(hi j 'i)ui() 
P
hi2n;fr;sgi 1
i(hi j 'i)ui(~i; i);
where i(hi j 'i) is consistent with Bayesrule whenever possible.
A strategy prole and a system of beliefs are a PBE if, and only if, the strategy is sequentially rational
for all players and beliefs are consistent with the strategy.
We nd that the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the two communication technologies is that the
revolution succeeds, and every willing individual chooses to revolt. In this case, both technologies generate
the same behavior in equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium under both communication technologies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof of the result makes use of a backward induction argument.12 A willing individual chooses to
join the revolution if she observes that already t   1 individuals have revolted. Given this fact, a willing
individual who observes t  2 people participating in the revolution decides to revolt if she knows that after
her there is at least one more willing individual. Since predecessorstypes are publicly observable, she can
infer if there is a willing individual behind her. Iterating this reasoning, a willing individual decides to revolt
when up to her su¢ cient willing individuals have chosen to do so and she anticipates that enough willing
citizens behind her will follow suit. The conditions ensuring that this requirement is met at any position
imply that all willing citizens choose to participate in the revolution.
Our assumption on predecessorstype being public information is plausible in environments where the
people willing to overthrow the dictator can be associated to particular groups. Under these circumstances,
it is likely that when individuals acquire information they know both the actions and the types of those who
have already decided. In this case, the existence of any of the communication technologies ensures that the
revolution triumphs. If there is no technology, it is possible to nd equilibria where the individuals do not
coordinate and the dictator remains in power.
2.1.2 Type is private information
We study now the case where type is private information, although  is common knowledge. That is,
individuals know that there are su¢ cient people willing to revolt, but they do not know who they are. Given
the untrust and fear generated by dictators in repressive regimes, this setup may appear more plausible.
As claimed by several authors (e.g. Ginkel and Smith (1999), Kuran (1991, 1995)), decision making in any
revolution is clouded by a considerable amount of uncertainty. This uncertainty blurs the information about
the public discontent due to several reasons, e.g. the lack of free press, falsied preference revelation to
o¢ cial public opinion polls or the presence of informants penetrating all layers of the society, among others.
When type is private information, communication technologies only transmit to individuals the ac-
tions of predecessors. For the mass media technology, the information set of individual i becomes 'i =
f i; i; i  i   1g, so the amount of citizens of each type who have already decided is not known. In the
12For the social media case, when types are known, the result is also a straightforward consequence of having a Pareto-
dominant outcome in a game of perfect and complete information.
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case of social media, citizen is information set is given by 'i = f i; faj ;8j < igg. Hence, citizen i cannot
distinguish perfectly the type of her predecessors although she knows the exact sequence of decisions.13
The following proposition shows that under such circumstances the sort of communication technology
matters.
Proposition 3 Consider the case when type is private information. Under the social media technology, the
revolution always succeeds because each willing individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Under
the mass media technology,
 if t < nn +1 + 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution succeeds;
 if t  nn +1 +1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful and nobody revolts for certain
values of uw;r;R; uw;s and uw;r;F .
Proposition 3 states that social media technology enables revolution with certainty, when people know
that there are su¢ cient other people willing to take part in the revolt, even if they do not know who they
are. Mass media generate revolution only if the required number of participants to succeed is su¢ ciently
low. Mass media do not ensure that the revolution triumphs when a relatively high proportion of the society
is required to participate. The main di¤erence is that social media allow to identify if individuals who
have chosen to stay at home were unwilling or not. Hence, it is possible to infer exactly how many willing
individuals have not decided yet and by backward induction their choices can be anticipated. These elements
ensure that all willing individuals revolt. By contrast, when only mass media are available, inferring the type
of previous individuals who stayed at home is generally not possible. As a consequence, it is considerably
more di¢ cult to make sure that there are enough willing individuals left in the sequence of decisions and
that those individuals will revolt. Hence, with mass media the condition for successful revolts becomes quite
demanding.
3 Examples
We illustrate our results with two examples. In the rst one we analyze a simple society of n = 4 individuals
in order to clarify the mechanism why social media promote revolutions more than mass media. In the second
example, we use a society of n = 100 in order to illustrate the quantitative di¤erence in the e¤ectiveness of
social media versus mass media in fostering revolutions.
13Observing that somebody revolts indicates that she is of the willing type. However, since willing individuals may choose to
stay at home, observing that someone has chosen not to participate in the revolt does not imply that she is unwilling.
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Example 1 Imagine a society of four individuals, three of them are willing to overthrow the dictator.
The revolution is successful if at least three individuals participate (n = 4;  = 3; t = 3). As before, payo¤s
are such that uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F . In Figure 1 we illustrate the di¤erences between the communication
technologies.
We have drawn a reduced extensive-form representation of the game generated by each communication
technology. We name it reduced form because we have simplied the representation drawing only one of the
four branches that would follow each of the type vectors. At the beginning of the game, nature selects at
random one of them. In the four possible type vectors willing citizens are represented by black circles and
the unwilling one by a white circle. Since individuals only observe actions but not types, we have drawn
individuals as grey circles in the rest of the tree. In Appendix C we represent the complete decision tree for
the social media case.
At the top, we represent the case without communication technology in which the individuals decide
ignoring the decisions of their predecessors. In the middle, we depict the case of mass media. In this case,
an individual only knows the number of citizens that already joined the protests. For instance, imagine that
the fourth individual is informed that two individuals have chosen to revolt (and, consequently, one stayed
at home). She is not able to distinguish if the sequence was (r; r; s), (r; s; r) or (s; r; r), hence the information
that the citizen in position 4 has is compatible with three possible sequences of decisions. At the bottom,
we draw the social media case. Individuals are able to identify perfectly the sequence of decisions, but they
do not know the type vector (even though through observed actions they may infer something about it).
We show that in the case of no communication technology and mass media we may nd equilibria leading
to both successful revolution and to everyone staying at home. By contrast, with social media the unique
equilibrium is the one where all willing individuals revolt.
Without communication technology, there are two possible equilibria (in pure strategies): the three
willing individuals either choose to revolt or choose to stay at home. This is the case because for a willing
individual to revolt (stay at home) is the best response when the other willing individuals choose to revolt
(stay at home).
Next, consider mass media. A willing individuals optimal decision in the last position is obvious. If she
observes two people revolting (4 = 2), then she revolts. Otherwise she stays at home. The same is true for
a willing individual in position 3 (if 3 = 2 , she best responds by revolting). As a consequence, a willing
citizen in position 2 observing one revolting individual (2 = 1) revolts as well, because she anticipates that
if she decides to revolt, then the last willing individual (either in position 3 or 4) will follow suit. Thus, in
any equilibrium a willing citizen revolts when 4 = 2; 3 = 2 or 2 = 1, and stays at home when 4 2 f0; 1g
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or 3 = 0. In these last cases, a willing individual knows that the revolution is doomed to fail, so she does
not join it.
Figure 1: Reduced extensive-form representations
Thus, we are left with the following i-s for which a willing citizens optimal action is not clear: 1; 2 = 0
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and 3 = 1. In words, we do not know yet what a willing citizen does when she is the rst to decide; when she
is in the second position and observes no protester and when third in the sequence of decision and observes
one protester. We show an equilibrium for the case of mass media where nobody revolts on the equilibrium
path for some payo¤s. Then, we show that it cannot be the case for social media.
Assume the following payo¤s: uw;r;R = 1, uw;s = 0 and uw;r;F =  10. In this case, if nobody chooses to
revolt in the previous information sets (1; 2 = 0 and 3 = 1) and acts optimally at the other information
sets, then we end up in an equilibrium without revolution. Thus, if willing individuals stay at home when
1; 2 = 0 and 3 = 1, nobody has a protable unilateral deviation. Take the rst individual. The deviation
consists in revolting instead of staying at home. The deviation is protable if the second individual is willing,
because the rst individual induces the second citizen to revolt as well by the arguments we have seen before.
In this case, the revolution triumphs and the highest utility is obtained. When the second individual is
unwilling (which has conditional probability 13), then the proposed strategies imply that subsequent willing
individuals will stay at home and the revolution fails. Therefore, the unilateral deviation is not protable if
and only if
uw;s >
2
3
uw;r;R +
1
3
uw;r;F ;
which holds for the proposed payo¤s. It is easy to check that if a willing citizen in position 2 observes
that nobody has revolted yet (2 = 0), then given the prescribed strategy she does not have a protable
unilateral deviation. The same holds for a willing individual in position 3 when she observes that just one
citizen has revolted (3 = 1). This is the case if the individual believes with su¢ cient probability that she
will be followed by the unwilling citizen.14 Note also that the equilibrium in which each willing individual
participates exists if we simply consider a strategy prole that establishes that willing individuals should
revolt when 1; 2 = 0 and 3 = 1.
We prove now that under social media there is a unique equilibrium in which all willing individuals revolt
and succeed in overthrowing the dictator. For a willing individual in the last position the previous arguments
apply. Thus, upon observing that two other citizens have revolted (the order does not matter) she revolts as
well, otherwise she stays at home. When in position 3, a willing individual joins the protest when observing
two protesters. As a consequence, a willing individual in the second position, who observes that the rst
citizen decided to protest, will revolt as well, anticipating that the last willing individual (either in position
3 or 4) will join the protests as well.
14This information set is o¤ the equilibrium path. A willing individual in position 3 may assign positive probability to observe
two willing individuals, and inferring that one of them deviated from the prescribed strategy. However, the revolution cannot
succeed, so revolting does not pay o¤, yielding staying at home the optimal decision.
13
As a next step, let us consider what happens if a willing citizen observes (r; s), that is the rst citizen
revolted, whereas the second one stayed at home. By previous reasoning she can be sure that the second
individual was the unwilling one (a willing individual in the second position would have joined the uprising
upon observing that the rst citizen revolted), so she knows that the last citizen is willing and anticipating
her reaction to observing a history with two citizens revolting she decides to protest as well.
Given the previous argument, a willing individual in the rst position chooses optimally to protest, since
any history starting with a revolting citizen leads to a successful revolution (either if she is followed by a
willing individual who protests herself or when followed by an unwilling one who stays at home, but then
the next individual will join the protest and in any case the last willing individual will revolt as well). As
a consequence, when observing that the rst individual has stayed at home, willing citizens know that she
must have been the unwilling one. Thus, willing citizens know that the type vector is (x;w;w;w) and by
backward induction they play the unique equilibrium of this subgame in which all of them rebel against
the dictator. Hence, as the game unfolds in any information set that can be reached, willing individuals
revolt and the dictator is overthrown. Notice that these arguments are valid for any payo¤s such that
uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F . Note also that with social media the outcome is unique because individuals are able
to distinguish the histories (r; s) and (s; r).
Example 2 Mass media can also foment revolutions, for any possible payo¤s, but only if just a relatively
low proportion of the society is required to participate in order to triumph. Imagine a society of 100
individuals, where 76 of them want to overthrow the dictator that is achieved if at least 51 citizens revolt
(n = 100;  = 76; t = 51). If all individuals decide simultaneously (the case without communication
technology), both results are possible: the revolution may succeed or fail. This occurs both when type is
public or private information.
If type is public information, following Proposition 2 the unique equilibrium implies that revolution occurs
for sure with either sort of communication technology.
Suppose that type is private information: it is unknown which concrete people are in favour of the
revolution, although every individual knows that there are 76 people willing to revolt. Because of Proposition
3, under mass media technology, for given payo¤s, it is possible that nobody takes part in the revolts, since
t = 51 > 5 = nn +1 + 1. This means that even though more than three-quarters of the citizens wish to
overthrow the dictator, they succeed for sure only if 5 or less people are required to participate in the revolts.
The intuition behind this result is the following. If an individual can be sure that the revolution succeeds,
then she joins the protests. Whenever she may believe that with positive probability the revolution fails, it is
14
possible to nd a punishment that is su¢ ciently large to deter individuals from participating in the protests.
Suppose that a willing individual observes that 49 individuals have revolted. If she has 24 or less successors,
then she may believe that all of them are unwilling and, therefore, she will stay at home, rendering the
revolution unsuccessful. If there are at least 25 individuals left to decide, then she can be sure that one of
them is of the willing type and will revolt upon observing that already 50 individuals joined the protests.
Hence, a willing individual who knows that 49 individuals have already revolted and others have stayed at
home, chooses to revolt for sure if she is in position 75 or before. By similar arguments, a willing individual
who observes that 48 individuals joined the protests (and also knows that others stayed at home) revolts
only if she knows that there are at least two other willing individuals behind her and anticipates that those
individuals will revolt as well. Therefore, she will choose to revolt if she is at most in position 50. Note
that if she is at any position lower than 75, she knows that there are two willing individuals behind her,
but to make sure that they both will revolt, she needs to verify that the next willing individual will be sure
that there is one more willing individual left to decide. If she is at most in position 50, then she knows that
there will be another willing individual in any of the positions [51; 75] who by observing a revolt will join
the protests as well because she knows that there is at least one more willing citizen in any of the positions
[76; 100] who will do the same. This line of reasoning yields the result that given the above parameters a
revolution is successful with mass media only if 5 or less individuals are required to participate. Otherwise,
the revolution may fail.
In particular, suppose that payo¤s are uw;r;R = 1, uw;s = 0 and uw;r;F =  10100. Hence, the dictator
would punish very strongly the participants of a failed revolution. We prove in Appendix D that under these
payo¤s it is possible that nobody revolts when people get information under mass media. However, as shown
by Proposition 3, under these conditions revolution succeeds with social media.
In our example, mass media communication guarantees that the revolt succeeds only if t  5 individuals
participation is necessary to overthrow the dictator. In a society of 100 individuals in which 51 people are
required to participate in the protests to change the regime, mass media facilitate a successful revolution
(with all willing individuals revolting) for any payo¤s only if it is known that all individuals ( = 100) are
in favour of the revolution. If the required threshold were t = 49, mass media would guarantee that the
revolution succeeds only if it was commonly known that at least  = 99 individuals are of the willing type.
Thus, mass media lead to a successful revolution only if there is a huge amount of people willing to participate
in the protests, or if the dictator is very weak (the threshold is very low). In any other case, the dictator
could implement a su¢ ciently high punishment (uw;r;F ) so that revolts may not occur in equilibrium.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the di¤erential e¤ect of communication technologies on the outcome of revo-
lutions. We distinguish mass and social media by the degree of information that they provide. In particular,
mass media supply an aggregate piece of information about the actual state of revolution, while when in-
formed through social media individuals know the precise sequence of decisions that led to the actual state.
When individuals types are public information, both communication technologies enable a successful
revolution with certainty, a result that does not hold without communication technology. Hence, both mass
and social media facilitate the overthrow of the dictator. When types are private information, we show that
the sort of communication technology is relevant: with social media the revolution succeeds in the unique
equilibrium. However, with mass media the revolution may fail except in cases when the amount of people
required to succeed is su¢ ciently low. If the punishment for participating in a failed revolution is su¢ ciently
high, with mass media the no-revolution equilibrium may be sustained, but it is not true for the social media
technology. In this sense, we argue that social media facilitate revolts more than mass media do.
Our model relies on strong simplications. Besides the degree of information aggregation, there are
more di¤erences between communication through social media with respect to mass media. For instance,
it is likely that dictators control the information provided through mass media. Moreover, communication
technologies may be used to supply false information. Another key point that we do not consider is that
individuals are heterogeneous, i.e. the case of opinion leaders whose decisions may have di¤erent implications
depending on the communication technology. Our assumptions about perfect knowledge of the position in
the sequence of decisions and the complete information about previous decisions are also stark. All these
considerations may result crucial when analyzing the e¤ects of di¤erent sorts of communication technology
and seem promising future research topics. However, our aim was to show the existence of a mechanism
that can at least partly explain some of the di¤erences that communication through social media is bringing
to the society. Our results suggest that social media facilitate the e¢ cient decisions under payo¤ structures
that possibly generate coordination failures under mass media.
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5 Appendix A
Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equi-
librium under both technologies.
Proof. The existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed by standard arguments. We show that in the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium each willing individual revolts. Since Perfect Bayesian equilibria are a subset
of subgame perfect equilibria, the proposition follows.15
Let us dene i = # f j = w : j  i j  i = w; g, that is the position of a willing individual i among the
willing individuals in a given type vector (). Note that i 2 f1; 2; ::g, with  > t:
By backward induction, the last willing individual (i = ) revolts if at least t 1 other willing individuals
decided to revolt, because if she follows suit, then the number of protesters reaches the threshold t, so the
revolution will be successful. Otherwise she decides to stay at home. The next to the last willing individual
(i =    1) revolts if at least t   2 willing predecessors chose to revolt anticipating that then also the last
willing individual will join in. Again, if the condition is not met, then she stays at home. This argument can
be repeated for all willing individuals: the individual i revolts if at least t   (   i + 1) other individuals
decided to revolt, otherwise she prefers to stay at home. As a consequence, the rst willing individual (i = 1)
revolts even if she does not observe anybody revolting (t   < 0). Therefore, the revolution succeeds.
Notice that the previous argument to nd the unique subgame perfect equilibrium works for both types
of media, thus Proposition 2 holds.
6 Appendix B
Proposition 3 Consider the case when type is private information. Under the social media technology,
the revolution always succeeds because each willing individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Under the mass media technology,
 if t < nn +1 + 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution succeeds;
 if t  nn +1+1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful and nobody revolts for certain
values of uw;r;R; uw;s and uw;r;F .
15We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for consistency with the private information case.
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Proof. Let (fg ; fg) =  i ;  i	 ;i ;  i	 be an assessment, a prole of behavioral strategies 
and beliefs  for each player in each of her information sets, that denes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. i
and i are, respectively, the equilibrium strategy and belief of individual i. Therefore 

i is a best response
to  i conditional on 

i . We focus only on the decisions of willing individuals.
First, we prove that under social media in the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium every willing citizen
chooses to revolt, and therefore the revolution succeeds. Second, we prove that under mass media, every
willing individual revolts over the equilibrium path if t < nn +1 + 1. Third, we construct an equilibrium in
which the willing individuals fail to coordinate and do not rise up against the dictator if t  nn +1 + 1.
First. For the social media case, in which individual i observes the sequence of previous decisions, let
denote as i(k;  i) the set of information sets in which individual i:
 observes k citizens who revolt and i  k   1 citizens who stay at home, with i  k   1 < N   ;
 individual i is willing;
 given the equilibrium strategy  i, j
 
 j = w;'j j'i

= r; 8j < i, where 'j j'i indicates that 'i is
a continuation of 'j , so up to individual j the two information sets coincide (except for the type of
individual i).
Let focus now on an information set 'i 2 i(k;  i). Take any history hi = f ; a1; :::; ai 1g in which
there are a maximum of N      1 unwilling individuals before i and where there is at least one willing
individual who has chosen to stay at home, 9j < i : f j = w; aj = sjhig. Take another history h0i which is
the same as hi but in which one of the willing individuals who chooses s in hi is of type x in h0i.
16 Since we
use the concept of PBE, consistent beliefs for hi require  (hij'i; ) = 0. It follows from our focus on the
set of information sets i(k;  i) that imply that a willing individual observing any particular information
set belonging to 'i chooses to revolt. Note that in those information sets we can nd an alternative history
h0i where "stay at home" is chosen only by unwilling individuals (since i   k   1 < N   ). Since the rest
of actions have been chosen by the same type of individuals under hi and under h
0
i, and under h
0
i people
who stay at home would choose that action with positive probability (they are unwilling individuals), Bayes
rule requires to assign probability 0 to the history hi. Therefore, if an individual is observed to have stayed
at home, then she cannot have been a willing one. Thus, any history with at least one willing individual
choosing to stay at home in an information set 'i 2 i(k;  i) has probability 0. Since i k 1 citizens who
16Therefore, there is also an individual of type x according to hi with an index higher than i, who is of type w according to
h
0
i.
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are observed by i stay at home, it is believed with probability 1 that after individual i there is a maximum
of N      (i  k   1) unwilling individuals and thus, a minimum of    k   1 willing individuals.17
Suppose now that any willing individual j chooses to revolt in any information set 'j 2 j(k0;  j), for
all k0 > k. Then, if individual i chooses to revolt in the information set 'i 2 i(k;  i), the following willing
individual i0 will be in an information set of type 'i0 2 i0(k+1;  i0), and will play r (by assumption).18 And
also the following willing individuals will be in an information set of type j(k0;  j) and, by assumption, will
revolt. Since individual i observes k citizens revolting and has  k 1 willing successors, in total there will be
 > t individuals revolting and i receives the highest payo¤by revolting (because the revolution is successful).
If individual i stays at home, then she obtains the sure payo¤ (uw;s), but has a protable deviation. Namely,
if she revolts instead of staying at home, then her successors will observe one more individual who revolts,
and moreover, there is no action s observed and chosen with positive probability by a willing individual.
This means that willing successors upon observing that individual i has revolted, will choose to revolt also
(because they will be in an information set 'j 2 j(k0;  j) and the revolution will be successful). Therefore,
we have proved that if any willing individual revolts in an information set 'j 2 j(k0;  j), for all k0 > k, a
willing individual i revolts in equilibrium in the information sets 'i 2 i(k;  i).
But note that if k  t  1, then willing individuals choose for sure r. So, by backward induction willing
individuals for k = t   2; t   3; :::0 will do so as well: Therefore, for all k, willing individuals revolt in the
information sets of type 'i 2 i(k;  i).
We do not know yet if i(k;  i) is empty or not, although we already know that a willing individual
chooses optimally to revolt if she is in an information set of that type and, moreover, any willing successor
of an individual in anyone of those information sets, will be also in an information set of that type. But
note that if individual 1 is willing, then she is in an information set '1 2 1(0;  1), and, therefore, she
chooses r. But then, if r or s is observed by individual 2, then she is in an information set '2 2 2(1;  2)
or '2 2 2(0;  2), respectively, and so on for all information sets over the equilibrium path. Therefore,
any willing citizen chooses to participate in the revolt in the social media case. Since  > t, the revolution
17Our argument applies for all histories in which there are a maximum of N      1 unwilling individuals before i. For a
history with N    unwilling individuals before i, it is trivial that there are at least    k   1 willing individuals after i.
18Given 'i 2 i(k;  i), note that the individual j that follows i observes the same sequence of decisions than i plus the
action of i. If she is willing, then she is in an information set 'j 2 j(k + 1;  i) if individual i chooses r. This is the case
because individual j observes k + 1 revolts and she is in position i + 1, so that j   (k + 1)   1 < N    and all the actions of
"stay at home" that she observes are chosen with probability 0 according to . If citizen i+1 is unwilling and individual i+2
is willing, it is easy to check that 'i+2 still is an information set of type 'i+2 2 i+2(k+ 1;  fi 2g), and so on. If individual
i is in an information set of type 'i 2 i(k;  i), the willing successor who follows will be with probability 1 in an information
set of the same type, given that individual i plays r.
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succeeds. Q:E:D:
Second. Suppose that t < nn +1 + 1.
Let dene as i(k) the set of information sets of individual i in which
 individual i is willing;
 n  i  (t  k   1) (n   + 1) :
Note that if individual i is in an information set 'i 2 i (k) and chooses r, then the following willing
individual j is also in an information set 'j 2 j (k + 1). Let be j the following willing individual after i, so
that we know that j  i+ (n   + 1). If i chooses r, then kj = k + 1. Note that
n  j  n  i  (n   + 1) =
=    1  i     1  n+ (t  ki   1) (n   + 1) =
= (t  k   2) (n   + 1) = (t  kj   1) (n   + 1)
Thus, if 'i 2 i (k) and ai = r, then we have that 'j 2 i (k + 1), where j is the following willing individual.
But note that, by forward induction, this means that all willing successors of i are in information set of type
' 2  (k0), if all of them choose r.
Suppose now that any willing citizen j chooses r if she is in an information set 'j 2 j (k0) ;8k0 > k.
This means that j
 
'j 2 j (k0)

= r; 8k0 > k. If it is the case, note that individual i best responds by
revolting if she is in an information set 'i 2 i (k), since she has at least (t  k   1) (n   + 1) successors
from which a maximum of n    are unwilling and she needs that (t  k + 1) willing individuals choose to
revolt, which is true by assumption. But note that j
 
'j 2 j (k0)

= r; 8k0 > (t  2) holds trivially. Thus,
that by backward induction we have that individual i chooses optimally the action r in any information set
'i 2 i (k), 8k  0.
But since we have that t < nn +1 + 1, we have also that n > (t  1) (n   + 1), implying (n  1) 
(t  1) (n   + 1). This means that individual 1, if willing, is in an information set of type '1 2 1 (0).
Hence, she chooses r in equilibrium and also their successors do the same, if they are of the willing type.
Suppose that the rst willing individual is not in position 1; but 1 < i  (n   + 1). The second
individual, if she observes that the rst one has chosen to stay at home, knows with probability 1 that she is
unwilling, and therefore her rst willing successor j will be in position j  (n   + 2). Thus, if she chooses r,
the successor j will be in an information set 'j 2 j (1) and will best respond by revolting, as well as all the
other willing successors. So that she best responds by revolting. Iterating this reasoning, if the rst willing
individual to choose observes a sequence of people staying at home, then she knows with probability 1 that
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it is due to unwilling individuals, and she knows that there is a willing individual among the rst (n   + 2)
individuals who will observe the action r of the rst willing individual, and will be in an information set of
type 'j 2 j (1). Therefore, the rst willing individual chooses r and all the successors choose r since they
are in an information set 'i 2 i (k). As a consequence, the revolution succeeds. Q:E:D:
Third. Now we construct an equilibrium with the coordination failure of no revolution under the mass
media communication when t  nn +1 +1. Let denote as 'i (i) the information set 'i = fw; i; i  i   1g.
Dene the following strategy for each willing individual:
i ('i (i)) =
8<: r if i  n  (n   + 1) (t  i   1)s otherwise
We show that (fg ; fg) = (fi;  ig ; fi;  ig) denes an equilibrium assessment where nobody revolts
over the equilibrium path, for certain values of uw;r;F and uw;s.
Note that this strategy implies that nobody chooses the action r over the equilibrium path. This is
the case because following i a willing individual that does not observe any revolt chooses to participate
if i  n   (n   + 1) (t  1). However, since t  nn +1 + 1, we have that i  n   (n   + 1) (t  1) 
n   (n   + 1) nn +1 = 0. Therefore,  implies that nobody chooses to revolt when observing no other
action r. We show now that this is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for some payo¤s.
For those information sets in which individuals revolt, the strategy is a best response to the rest of
individualsstrategies and implies consistent beliefs because of the same argument as those in part Second of
the proof. We prove now that individuals do not have any protable deviation when choosing s, for certain
values of uw;r;F and uw;s. Note that the action s is a best response in the information sets 'i () : i 
n   (n   + 1) (t  (  2)  1)   1. This is the case because if individual i chooses r in such information
sets, individual i+1 will be in an information set where i+1 > n (n   + 1) (t  (  1)  1), and therefore
she and her successors will stay at home. Thus, s is a best response for i.
Now we focus on those information sets where 'i () : n   (n   + 1) (t  (  2)  1)   1  i  n  
(n   + 1) (t    1). Any of these information sets is o¤ the equilibrium path, and, therefore, reached
with probability 0. Given , all the individuals previous to individual i should play s for both types.
Consequently, consistent beliefs may assign positive probability to a sequence of predecessors formed by
max fi  1; g willing individuals. In this case, with positive probability p either there is no subsequent
willing citizen or the following willing successor is an individual j > n  (n   + 1)  (t  ) and she and all
her successors will best respond by choosing s, a case in which the revolution fails. Therefore, with positive
probability p the individual would obtain a payo¤ uw;r;F < uw;s by choosing r. For uw;r;F su¢ ciently low
with respect to uw;s, i is also a best response to  i conditional on consistent i. Hence, (fg ; fg) denes
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an equilibrium assessment where nobody revolts.
7 Appendix C
Figure 2 represents the complete decision tree for the case of social media. Individuals are able to distinguish
the sequence of actions but they do not know the type vector. For simplicity, the information nodes that
belong to the same information set for individuals in position 3 and 4 have been marked with the same
geometrical shape.
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Figure 2: Decision tree of the social media case in Example I
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8 Appendix D
Example 2: Suppose that n = 100;  = 76; t = 51; and consider the following payo¤s: uw;r;R = 1; uw;s = 0
and uw;r;F =  10100. We study the case of mass media. Then the following strategy for willing individuals
i ('i; i) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
r if
8>>><>>>:
i = 50;8i
i = 49;8i  75
i = 48;8i  50
s otherwise
where i is the amount of participants that have chosen r before individual i, denes a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for consistent beliefs .
Proof: We focus on the willing individuals. For simplicity, from now on we denote as 'i (i) the
information sets 'i (i) = fw; i; i  i   1g.
For the information sets 'i (50) it is obvious that the above strategy is optimal. Given this fact, an
individual i in an information set 'i(49); 8i  75, best responds by choosing r. It is the case because she has
25 successors, and at most 24 of them are unwilling. Therefore, if she chooses r, with probability 1 there is
a willing successor j, and she will move in an information set 'j (50). Thus, the proposed strategy is a best
response in the above information sets. The same reasoning applies in the information sets 'i(48); 8i  50,
since there will be with probability 1 at least one willing individual in an information set 'i(49); i  75.
Note that any individual j that observes j < 47 best responds to the strategy  j by choosing s. This
is the case, because in such an information set, if the individual chooses r the strategy  j implies with
probability 1 that no further individual chooses it and the revolution fails, yielding the payo¤uw;r;F =  10100.
The same argument applies for 'i(47) when i 2 [50; 100] and for 'i(48) when i 2 [75; 100].
Finally, we have to prove that the strategy is optimal in the rest of information sets. We start with the
information sets where 'i(47) when i 2 [1; 50). This can be the case only if i 2 [48; 49]. Since according
to the proposed strategy nobody should choose r in any of these information sets (there were no previous
information set with  = 48), the beliefs can be assigned arbitrary. We use, however, the reasonable belief
of assigning probability 1 to the fact of having 47 willing predecessors and i  48 unwilling ones. Therefore,
the individual believes that she has 28 willing successors and 23 or 24 unwilling ones, depending on if she
is individual 48 or 49. For the individual i = 49, with probability p = 2651 the individual 50 would be of the
willing type and would best respond with r if individual 49 chooses r, and the revolution would succeed.
With probability p = 2551 the follower will be of the unwilling type, and if she chooses r she would get the
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lowest payo¤. Therefore, her expected utility is
u49 (r; '49 (47) ;  49; 49) =
26
51
uw;r;R +
25
51
uw;r;F =
=
27
51
 1 + 24
51
   10100 < 0 = uw;s =
= u49 (s; '49 (47) ;  49; 49)
Therefore, 49 ('49 (47)) is a best response conditioned on i. The same reasoning holds in '48 (47).
We show now that the strategy is optimal for 'i(48) when i 2 [51; 100]. Note that in the information
sets 'i (48) ; i = [51; 100] individual i = 51 is the one with the highest likelihood of being followed by
su¢ cient willing individuals so that a successful revolution arises. We construct the beliefs of individual i
assuming that she assigns probability 1 to the event of having 50 willing predecessors. This is consistent
with the proposed strategy : since all individuals should choose s in any possible previous information set,
basically any belief is equally likely. Under that belief, individual i = 51 is followed with probability 1 by 24
unwilling individuals and 25 willing individuals. With probability p =
24Y
i=1
25 i
50 i = 1:58  10 14 the following
24 successors of individual 51 are unwilling (and the last 25 individuals are willing). If individual 51 chooses
r then with probability
 
1  1:58  10 14 a willing individual will be in an information set 'i(49); 8i  75,
and she will choose the action r and also the rest of willing individuals, and the revolution succeeds. But
with probability 1:58  10 14 the following 24 individuals will be unwilling, no willing individual will choose
the action r and the revolution fails. Therefore, the expected utility of individual 51 is
E (u51 (r; '51 (48) ;  51) j51) =
 
1  1:58  10 14  uw;r;R + 1:58  10 14  uw;r;F =
=
 
1  1:58  10 14  1 + 1:58  10 14    10100 < 0 = uw;s =
= E (u51 (s; '51 (48) ;  51) j51)
and choosing s is a best response in the information set '51 (48). The same argument can be applied in the
rest of information sets.
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